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Eight or nine years ago the American Bar Association honored the
then President of Romania, Emil Constantinescu, at a luncheon during its
annual meeting in Atlanta. I was invited to deliver the keynote speech at
the luncheon. I arrived at Atlanta Airport after a long flight from
Johannesburg. I presented my passport to the immigration official and the
passport officials said to me, "What are you doing in the United States?,"
and I said, "Well, I am attending the annual meeting of the American Bar
Association" and he looked down and he looked up and he said "oh, you're
giving a keynote address?" and I said, "Yes, you're correct". He made me
feel very important and after buttoning my jacket and standing a little taller,
I asked him: How do you know that?" and he responded "Everyone
coming in today is giving a keynote address. I thanked him for giving me a
great opening for my keynote address. I thought it might be good opening
today.
The subject of my talk today is the future of international criminal
justice and the crucial role of the United States (U.S.). It is important that I
spend a few minutes talking about recent history and especially the huge
advances that have been made during the past seventy years. Advances in
the law and legal institutions are invariably the consequence of changes on
the ground. This applies to all branches of the law. Changes in tax law
occur after new ways of avoiding the payment of tax are developed. New
inventions such as the Internet require new laws to cope with the
consequences. New laws always come after the event. That is particularly
the case with regard to international criminal law. It is probably inevitable
that the significant changes have come about as a result of catastrophes.
The beginning of modern international criminal law is obviously the
Nuremberg Trial of the major Nazi leaders. That was one of the
consequences of the terrible crimes that were committed by the Hitler
regime and especially the Holocaust.
One of the most important of the legacies of Nuremberg was the idea
of crimes against humanity. The idea is that some crimes, atrocity crimes,
are so egregious and shocking to all decent people that they constitute
crimes not only against the immediate victims, but against all of humankind
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no matter where situated. This led to the extension of universal jurisdiction
from piracy to these international crimes.
The first international recognition of universal jurisdiction is to be
found in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. It was made applicable to
the investigation and prosecution of the "grave breaches" defined by those
conventions. The second application of universal jurisdiction occurred only
some 24 years later in the United Nations (U.N.) convention of 1973 that
declared Apartheid in South Africa to constitute a crime against humanity.
It conferred universal jurisdiction upon the courts of all countries to
prosecute that offense. It took another eleven years for universal
jurisdiction to be used in the Torture Convention of 1984. Whilst the
Apartheid Convention did not lead to any investigations at all, the Torture
Convention became the basis for a Spanish Court in 1999 seeking the arrest
in the United Kingdom of General Pinochet, the former dictator of Chile.
Since then universal jurisdiction has been incorporated into more than
a dozen international conventions dealing with the combatting of
international terrorism. They date from the 1970s. One of the main reasons
for this is the avoidance of safe havens for terrorists.
After the Nuremberg Trials it was widely assumed that there would be
a treaty-based international criminal court. There is indeed reference to
such a court in the Genocide Convention of 1948. However, the Cold War
intervened and the very idea of such a court barely survived. And then
again in 1993, it took genocide and crimes against humanity to have the
Security Council of the United Nations establish an international criminal
court to investigate and prosecute the war crimes being committed in the
former Yugoslavia. For a similar reason the second such court was
established by the Security Council for Rwanda. In turn, they were
followed by the so-called hybrid tribunals-the Special Courts for Sierra
Leone, East Timor, Cambodia and Lebanon. They were followed by the
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) that now has the support of
121 nations.
Many politicians are ambivalent about the ICC. They think it is a
good idea for other nations but not for them. This is perhaps best
exemplified by the approach of the United States and I will revert to this
question. There is an ambivalence of a different kind in some of the
African capitals and at the African Union. The facts are that of the seven
situations presently before the ICC, two have been referred by the Security
Council (Sudan and Libya), three have been referred by governments
(Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African
Federation and only two have come before the Court as a result of the
Prosecutor using his own powers (Kenya and the Ivory Coast). It is a little
unfair to accuse the Court of being biased against African countries. This
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unfortunate perception will continue to exist until non-African countries
become the subject of ICC investigations.
In parenthesis, I would add that prosecutors at the ICC should be wary
of too readily accepting referrals from governments. It is inevitable that
such referrals are made for political gain rather than to seek justice. It is not
in itself a reason to refuse to accept a reference but it is, I would suggest, a
good reason for caution. To borrow Justice Jackson's immortal phrase, it
might well be a poisoned chalice.
When the Security Council established the ad hoc tribunals or refers
cases to the ICC it clearly invades the sovereignty of the targeted nations.
This was true of the nations of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina. So, too, Rwanda which, after having requested
the tribunal decided in the end that it did not wish the Security Council to
establish it. There was a similar clear invasion of the sovereignty of Sudan
and Libya when the Security referred those situations to the ICC under
Article 16 of the Rome Statute.
I turn now to consider the role that the United States of America
played in these events. I need not dwell too long on Nuremberg but I'm
sure there are a few people in this room who do not know that it was at the
United States' insistence the Nuremberg trials were held in 1945. Its view
prevailed over the notorious resistance and opposition to the idea by then
Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. He wanted to line up the Nazi leaders
and summarily execute them. He said, "Everybody knows what they did
and why should we give them the benefit or the privilege of having a trial."
Josef Stalin, the Soviet leader, supported the U.S. insistence on a trial. He
clearly had in mind a "show trial" in the form that was only too familiar to
him. So, in the end, it is the United States that can claim the major credit
for having set up the Nuremberg trials. That role was crowned by the
outstanding leadership of the enterprise that came from Justice Robert
Jackson, the U.S. Chief Prosecutor.
I now fast-forward to 1993 when the ICTY was set up as the first truly
international criminal tribunal. Nuremberg, it should be remembered, was
not an international tribunal. Together with the Tokyo War Crimes
proceedings, they were multi-national courts set up by the victorious
nations. They were really founded on the theory that what these nations
could do on their own, they could clearly do together. In effect they pooled
their individual jurisdictions. I would also point out that the judges came
from victorious nations and, so too, the prosecutors. There was not even a
multi-national prosecutors' office. Each of the four nations at Nuremberg
appointed its own chief prosecutor and he worked with his own nationals.
It was also the United States that pushed the Security Council, in 1993,
to set up an international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Both
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Russia and China had mixed feelings about it. And certainly, before the
end of the Cold War in 1989 this would not have happened. It was' the
politics of 1993 that created a window of opportunity. It allowed led the
United States during the Clinton administration and particularly under the
supervision of Madeline Albright, who was then the U.S. permanent
representative at the United Nations, to push for the establishment of the
first ever truly international criminal court. It was Ambassador Albright's
personal commitment; it was her leadership and enthusiasm that were really
the main driver of the Yugoslavia and the Rwanda tribunals. I say this from
personal knowledge and personal involvement.
There are many anecdotal illustrations I could give of this role that the
United States played. First, without the role played by the United States,
the Yugoslavia tribunal would not have been established. Having been
established, it experienced severe teething problems. It took 18 months
before the Security Council found a prosecutor. I was approached as at act
of desperation. I was hardly equipped for the position. However, in the
preceding 8 months, one or other of the members of the Security Council
had vetoed no less than eight of the nominees put forward by the Secretary
General. The ICTY was on the point of collapse and it took the support of
newly elected President Nelson Mandela for a South African nominee to
enable the Russians and the Chinese to agree on the Prosecutor.
When I arrived at the Tribunal on 15t of August of 1994, I found a
skeleton staff of some 30 people in the office. That staff had not been
regularly appointed-only the Prosecutor was authorized by the Security
Council Statute to make appointments. There were twenty-three
Americans, sent as a gift to the United Nations, who had already begun
crucial work in those early days. Some of them had begun to create a
database. Amongst them were highly competent investigators and lawyers.
The first crisis I experienced after I arrived related to these twenty-three
Americans.
There is a strange 13% rule in the U.N. On first being informed of it,
it sounded crazy-that if any member state makes a gift to the U.N., such as
these twenty-three outstanding people, the provider, the donor country, has
to pay in cash to the United Nations 13% of the cost them of making the
gift. Under that rule along with the considerable cost of the paying for the
twenty-three, the United States would have had to pay some additional
millions of U.S. dollars to comply with the rule. There is, however, a good
reason for the rule. If you donate twenty-three people to the U.N., it costs
the U.N. money to accept the gift. The experts sent to The Hague needed
offices, they needed secretaries, investigators needed money to travel. The
13% is an arbitrary figure intended to supplement the budget. Without it
the U.N. would, in effect, be forced to use funds for which no provision had
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been made in the budget. A budget, remember, that is approved by all the
members of the United Nations. On this occasion, the United States said
"No, we've given this gift, this is a special gift, and we're not paying the
13%." And when I arrived in The Hague at their office, the headquarters of
the U.N. said we will not pay a penny towards the expenses for these
twenty-three people if we don't have the 13%. They couldn't use their
offices and effectively they could not do the work. This is what I faced in
the first day in the office. It was a most unpleasant shock. To be brief, I did
succeed in having the U.N. agree to waive the 13% rule but only for one
year. At the end of our second year, we had the same problem, and I went
cap in hand back to New York. They waived the rule for a second year.
Unfortunately, for my successor, Louise Arbor, the U.N. was adamant that
rule would not be waived. The result was that many of the twenty-three had
to go home. The roles played by those American experts were absolutely
essential in the early days of the office of the prosecutor.
Another crucial area of support and assistance from the United States
was cooperation on intelligence information. I didn't dare talk about this
until I was invited by the American Society of International Law to join a
panel talking about this question. Fortunately, the then head of the FBI was
one of the panel members. During a telephone conference call about a
week before the event he said that he would welcome my speaking about
some of the detail relating to the kind of information we received from the
United States. He added that there was no reason that that should be
regarded as classified in any way. He said that, "We are rather proud of the
assistance that we gave to the ICTY."
It took many days of meetings in Washington and The Hague with
United States officials to hammer out an agreement under which the
Yugoslavia tribunal prosecutors would be given classified information. We
were required under the agreement to build a special safe room to keep the
information that was accessible only to the chief prosecutor. Some highly
classified material could only be inspected at the U.S. Embassy in The
Hague. The importance of that information can't be exaggerated. A couple
of examples: the briefing that we received in Washington D.C. There was
a huge map on the wall showing the villages that had been attacked and
ethnically cleansed by the Serb army in Bosnia. It was part of the "Greater
Serbia" plan of incorporating into Serbia those towns and villages in which
there were significant numbers of Serbs. One could see on the map the
dates on which they were "ethnically cleansed:" the mosques bombed, the
women raped, and the people tortured. Very little of that information was
classified or sensitive. However, it would have taken us some months to
collect the information that was highly relevant in building cases against the
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Bosnian Serb leadership. And, bear in mind that we had very limited
resources in those early days of the life of the Tribunal.
Our investigators had access to hundreds of thousands of victims and
witnesses. There were over 300,000 Bosnian refugees living in Germany.
Now, those witnesses had not come into contact with members of the
leadership. They could provide testimony against camp commanders and
police officers. They could identify the criminals who tortured them in
their villages. We indicted some of those local leaders in order to create the
building bricks with which to go against those higher up the ladder of
command. We did that by relying on circumstantial evidence and proof of
command and control. We used in the indictment against Karadzic his
boasts, as commander-in-chief of the Bosnian Serb Army that nothing
happened in his army without him knowing of it.
With regard to the worst act of genocide since World War II, the
Srebrenica massacre, we were able to obtain first-hand information from a
member of the Bosnian Army firing squad, Drazan Erdemovic. He
informed us that he was an unwilling executioner who acted under extreme
duress. He lost count after he counted over seventy innocent Bosnian men
and boys were executed next to a mass grave. He was the only eye-witness
available to us. He was, however, able with some precision to tell us the
location of the mass grave. Within days we received satellite images from
Washington that conclusively corroborated the evidence of Erdemovic. We
received this information in confidence and it could not be used without the
consent of the U.S. Government. In no way did that detract from this
important corroborative information.
A prosecutor in an International Court is really a sitting duck for
malicious misinformation. A number of reports came in during my term in
office intended to have the Prosecutor use scarce resources on what would
have been a wild goose chase. It was helpful to be able to send send the
reports to Washington and say, "Please tell us whether this is serious.
Should we be looking into this or should we ignore it?" If we were told that
it was not worth following up that saved us many wasted hours of work.
The value of this kind of assistance cannot be exaggerated.
There was also important assistance for the Rwanda Tribunal. In the
weeks after the new Office of the Prosecutor was established, we had office
space in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. We had no furniture and we had no
computers. The United Nations at that point was just about on the brink of
bankruptcy in consequence of the United States going through one of its
severe anti-U.N. phases and withholding payment of its U.N. dues. The
United Nations couldn't afford to give us furniture or office supplies. A
friend in the U.N. Headquarters in New York mentioned to me that there
was a U.N. warehouse in Brindisi, on the eastern coast of Italy, full of
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furniture and computers--everything we needed was there. However, on
inquiry I was informed by the U.N. that the department that owned the
supplies could not afford to give them to us because of the adverse effect
that would have on its balance sheet. Kofi Annan was then the head of
Peacekeeping and we had become friendly. I called Kofi Annan and
explained the problem. He came back to me very promptly the next day
and he said, "Well, I have good news and bad news. The furniture is there
and the computers are there; you can have them." And I said, "What's the
bad news." And he said, "The bad news is we can't afford to send it to
you!" So, I picked up the phone and I called David Scheffer, the then
Senior Counsel in Madeleine Albright's office and I told him the problem.
Within 24 hours a huge U.S. transport plane brought us the supplies from
Brindisi. Until then our few staff members were literally using Coca-Cola
boxes as desks and chairs. We had to scrounge for paper and pencils for
them to use. There were no computers. So, you can image what a boost of
morale this was for the people in the office.
The United States' judges played a crucial role. Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald was one of the first eleven judges of the ICTY. She was a
former Federal judge in Texas. I know from hearsay from other judges of
the crucially important role she played in assisting her colleagues in writing
the rules of procedure and evidence that they had to work out for the
Yugoslavia tribunal, and years later almost without change for the Rwanda
tribunal.
Judge Pat Wald, the former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit also
played an important role during the two years she served at the ICTY.
Then, of course, there was Judge Ted Meron, formerly of NYU Law
School, who was recently elected to serve a second term as the President of
the ICTY.
American judges and lawyers played a similarly important role at the
ICTR and in the mixed or hybrid tribunals. The U.S. financial support for
these tribunals was also crucially important. This all makes me saddened at
the fact that the United States is not playing this kind of role with regard to
the ICC.
It was the United States that was primarily responsible for encouraging
the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan to call the diplomatic
meeting in Rome in June 1998 to consider a statute for the ICC. It was,
however, literally on the way to Rome that the United States grew cold.
Opposition to the Court from the Pentagon caused this instant chill. It was
their fear of U.S. military and political leaders coming before an
international court that was felt to be anathema. This led to the US joining
only six other countries in voting against the Rome Treaty. 120 voted in
favor of it.
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As one of his last acts as President, Bill Clinton signed the Rome
Treaty indicating that the United States would not take any action
inconsistent with the Rome Treaty. Regrettably that was soon followed
President George W. Bush "unsigning" the treaty. With the encouragement
of John Bolton the Bush Administration soon took active steps in an
attempt to kill the court in its infancy. The support of more than half of the
members of the U.N. ensured that those efforts failed.
During the second administration of President George W. Bush, in
2006, and to my astonishment, at an ASIL meeting a panel which I
happened to be moderating, the Legal Advisor at the State Department,
John Bellinger, stated that the State Department had decided now to
actively assist the ICC Prosecutor in those cases considered to be consistent
with U.S. foreign policy and that such assistance had already begun. That
announcement was followed by the United States deciding not to veto the
reference by the Security Council of the Darfur situation to the ICC. That
policy was still actively opposed by the military and the State Department
reportedly fought a tough battle to ensure that the United States did not
exercise its veto. I remember reading a speech by the then Ambassador for
War Crimes Issues, a few weeks before the Security Council vote, to the
effect that the United States would veto any reference of Darfur to the
Security Council because such a reference would give the court credibility.
And of course he was correct: it did give them credibility but he was
incorrect in that the State Department won that battle. It was Secretary of
State, Colin Powell who declared that what was happening in Darfur
constituted genocide. That was followed by unanimous resolutions in both
the House and Senate to the same effect. It was against that background
that the State Department correctly came to the conclusion that to veto a
reference of that situation to the ICC would have left its African policies in
tatters. More importantly, there was the more recent unanimous decision of
the Security Council to refer the Lbyan situation to the ICC. This warmer
approach to the ICC was carried forward by the administration of President
Obama.
The ICC is hardly out of the woods. There are serious problems and
we have been hearing about many of them from speakers yesterday and
today. There are the negative views coming from African leaders in
consequence of all seven situations before the Court relating to African
nations. That perception is understandable but a little unfair. Only two of
them have been initiated by the Prosecutor. The others were referred to the
Court by the Security Council or by African governments themselves.
Then there are the financial problems that result from some of the leading
members of the Assembly of States Parties calling for a negative growth
budget for the Court. That the Court is weaker for the absence of active
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participation of the United States is not difficult to comprehend. The
change in attitude in Washington to international courts is drastic.
The United States fear of bias on the part of the ICC was raised in one
of the panels. What is not appreciated sufficiently and especially in the
United States is that a professional office such as the Office of the
Prosecutor would not be able to get away with that kind of bias. There are
no secrets between members of a prosecutor's office. In such an office
there are senior lawyers and investigators from forty, fifty, sixty countries.
If there was a bias, an unprofessional bias, against any country in that sort
of office, it would become public in less than 24 hours. I can assure you of
that.
When I was chief prosecutor of the ICTY, we had a Russian lawyer on
our staff. He was sent to The Hague at my request. I have no doubt that he
would have reported to his Government any inappropriate anti-Serb
sentiment in the office. I would not have blamed him for doing so. So, too,
there would be objections to anti-United States or any other similar bias.
There are Americans working at the ICC. If there was a bias against the
United States they would certainly not tolerate it.
I will conclude by repeating what John Washburn said earlier today
concerning the importance of civil society and especially in the United
States. The United States is different from other major nations that oppose
the International Criminal Court. Russia is not ambivalent. China is not
ambivalent. For them the International Criminal Court is a bad idea and if
war criminals benefit from impunity, so be it. That is not the position in the
United States. In this country there must be few who approve of the
commission of serious war crimes and do not believe that war criminals
should not be punished. But there is this political fear or at least suspicion
that powerful countries including the United States have in respect of
international organizations. That is the main reason for U.S.
"exceptionalism." And bear in mind, the United States did not object to
being within the jurisdiction of the Yugoslavia tribunal with regard to
NATO attacks on Kosovo. There were complaints from Russia to the effect
that war crimes were committed by NATO. The prosecutor decided that
there was insufficient evidence to justify an inquiry into the allegations.
What is important is that the United States didn't for a moment say, "We
are not going to get involved in the Kosovo campaign.
There is no more effective way to withdraw impunity from war
criminals than to strengthen international justice. Some leaders around the
world are not sleeping well in light of the fate suffered by Milosevic and the
trials ongoing against Charles Taylor, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.
In respect of some of them there must surely be a deterrent factor. To
achieve success in the long run the role of the United States is crucial. This
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places a huge burden on civil society in this country. You, the people in
this room can make the difference. You can continue to influence your
government to do more in assisting international criminal justice. Thank
you very much.
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